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COLONIALISM WITHOUT COLONIES: ON 
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE U.S. COURT 
FOR CHINA 
TEEMU RUSKOLA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court for China was created by Congress in 1906, and it 
was not abolished until 1943. The Shanghai-based court had extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over all American citizens1 within its district, known as the “District 
of China” for jurisdictional purposes. The court is fascinating in its own right, 
and it produced what one observer has described as a “system of jurisprudence” 
that was “more complete than that of any [other] body of extraterritorial law.”2 
In this article, I will elaborate at some length on the court’s jurisprudence. In 
keeping with the theme of this symposium, I will focus on some of the conflicts-
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        1. “America” and “American” are used in this article purposely both overinclusively and 
underinclusively. This usage simply reflects the jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China, which 
sometimes treated the terms as roughly synonymous with the territory and citizens of the United States, 
and at other times used them to refer to places beyond the borders of the United States and to people 
who were not necessarily U.S. citizens.  
 2. Crawford M. Bishop, American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in China, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 281, 
297 (1926). 
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of-law problems the court had to face.3 As it turns out, those problems and the 
context in which they arose open a window onto the colonial history of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction more generally. In the end, the history of the U.S. 
Court for China exemplifies a kind of colonialism without colonies. 
Part I describes in some detail the law applied by the court, which consisted 
of a mélange of colonial common law as it existed prior to American 
independence, general congressional acts, the municipal code of the District of 
Columbia, and the code of the Territory of Alaska. Apart from the unusual 
jurisprudence the court produced, the court’s jurisdiction itself seems 
extraordinary, given the conventional wisdom that the principle of territorial 
sovereignty was predominant at the time. Part II places the court and its 
practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction within a longer global genealogy. Despite 
the contemporary rhetoric of globalization and its claims about the relatively 
stronger tendency for the extraterritorial application of national laws today, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was in fact the norm for much of the extra-European 
world through the nineteenth century. Ultimately, the unique, and seemingly 
arbitrary, jurisprudence the court produced was intimately connected with the 
extraterritorial nature of its jurisdiction. Part III suggests that the conflicts of 
law faced by the U.S. Court for China proved exceedingly difficult to resolve 
precisely because of the legal fiction of extraterritoriality upon which the court’s 
jurisdiction rested. As part of its mandate in applying the laws of the United 
States, the court was required to treat China as if it were the United States. Yet 
the principle of territoriality that performed a key role in resolving conflicts 
within the federal system in the United States could not do the same in China 
for the profoundly simple reason that, in the end, legal fictions aside, China was 
not America. Unsurprisingly, the end result was an imperial court that was left 
to fashion its own law, which in turn was distinct from that of every other 
territorial jurisdiction. Indeed, it constituted a kind of American common law of 
China, and the legal world of Americans in China constituted a kind of U.S. 
colony, albeit one that did not formally infringe on China’s territorial 
sovereignty. 
 
 3. My analysis of the court’s work draws on two volumes of case reports published by the court, 
entitled Extraterritorial Cases, as well as primary research, conducted in the National Archives, on the 
records of the U.S. State Department, which exercised supervisory control over the court during most 
of its existence. In addition, I have benefited from other recent work on the court, including EILEEN P. 
SCULLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE FROM AFAR: AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN TREATY PORT 
CHINA 1844–1942 (2001); David J. Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and the Constitution, 28 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 451 (1987–88) (focusing on the history of the concept of “extraterritorial domicile” in China); 
and Tahirih V. Lee, The United States Court for China: A Triumph of Local Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 923 
(2004) (analyzing the procedure and evidence law applied by the court). 
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II 
AN AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CHINA 
In 1906, Congress passed an act for the establishment of the U.S. Court for 
China.4 Although the court was likely “the strangest federal tribunal ever 
constituted by Congress,”5 it remains largely unknown.6 In fact, its history is part 
of a much longer history of American extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. In 
the nineteenth century, China’s refusal to accept “free trade” in opium (among 
other things) led to the so-called Opium War (1839–42) with Britain. At the 
conclusion of the war, China signed a series of treaties that have come to be 
known collectively as “Unequal Treaties,” which structured China’s 
relationship with the West for a century.7 The United States signed its first 
Unequal Treaty with China in 1844, in the village of Wanghia in Macao.8 
Among other things, this treaty secured the citizens of the United States the 
privilege of extraterritoriality when in China. 
For more than sixty years, the United States followed the model of the 
European powers and exercised its right of extraterritorial jurisdiction in so-
called consular courts: it vested its consular representatives in China with the 
power to adjudicate legal disputes. However, most consular judges had no legal 
training whatsoever. One particularly notorious American consul in fact prided 
himself on being “short on law” but “hell on equity.”9 A report by the State 
Department in 1905 confirmed what everyone already knew: American 
consular courts in China were plagued by incompetence, inefficiency, and 
corruption.10 In 1906, the Congress finally responded by creating the United 
States Court for China, which was to be a properly constituted judicial tribunal, 
in contrast to the irregular and unprofessional consular courts.11 
 
 4. An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction Thereof, 
Pub. L. No. 59-403, 34 Stat. 814 (1906), repealed 1948, in accordance with the Treaty for the 
Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, U.S.–China 
art. 1, Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767, 6 Bevans 739. 
 5. Bederman, supra note 3, at 452. 
 6. I describe the genesis of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in China in greater detail in Teemu 
Ruskola, Canton Is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial Sovereignty, 57 AM. Q. 859 (2005), 
reprinted in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 267 
(Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006). For another recent analysis emphasizing the “legalised 
hegemony” inherent in the globally uneven practice of extraterritoriality in the nineteenth century, see 
Gerry Simpson, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 227–53 (2004). 
 7. See generally DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 
(2005). 
 8. Treaty of Wanghia, U.S.–China, July 3, 1844, 8 Stat. 592, 6 Bevans 647. 
 9. NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, SHANGHAI LAWYER 97 (1943). In more diplomatic language, the 
Senate was told in 1850 that American consuls in China were “destitute of all legal requirements.” S. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 31–72, at 2 (1850). 
 10. See HERBERT H.D. PIERCE, REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES CONSULATES IN THE ORIENT 
(1904). 
 11. An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction Thereof, 
supra note 4. 
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The extraterritoriality provisions of the 1844 Treaty of Wanghia,12 together 
with subsequent revisions of the treaty,13 set up a system in which jurisdiction 
depended on the defendant’s nationality. A “citizen[] of the United States” who 
committed a crime in China was triable “only by the Consul, or other public 
functionary of the United States, thereto authorized according to the laws of the 
United States.”14 Similarly, “[s]ubjects of China” who were “guilty of any 
criminal act towards citizens of the United States” were to be punished “by the 
Chinese authorities according to the laws of China.”15 In civil suits as well, a 
Chinese plaintiff could sue an American citizen only in an American court, 
while an American citizen would have to sue a Chinese subject in a Chinese 
court.16 The legislation that formally set up a system of American consular 
courts in China codified this basic agreement.17 When the U.S. Court for China 
was created in 1906, it inherited the principles of consular jurisdiction.18 
How did the Court exercise its extraordinary extraterritorial jurisdiction? 
More specifically, what law did it apply? The oath to be taken upon admission 
to the bar of the U.S. Court for China required members to swear, among other 
things, that they would not bring suits that were “unjust,” except insofar as the 
justice of such suits was “honestly debatable under the law of the land.”19 But 
just what was the law of the land? Or, rather, the law of which land was the bar 
to uphold? At first glance, the answer was deceptively easy: the term “law of 
the land” referred to the “laws of the United States” according to Sino–
 
 12. Treaty of Wanghia, supra note 8. 
 13. Treaty of Tientsin, U.S.–China, June 18, 1858, 12 Stat. 1023, 6 Bevans 659; Treaty of Peking, 
U.S.–China, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 828, 6 Bevans 688. 
 14. Treaty of Tientsin, supra note 13, art. XI. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. However symmetrical this arrangement may seem—the Chinese could be sued only in 
Chinese courts under Chinese law, and Americans in American courts under U.S. law—such symmetry 
is ultimately misleading: the Chinese in America had no equivalent extraterritorial privileges. On the 
contrary, they were barred even from entering the country after the enactment of a series of Chinese 
exclusion laws, starting in 1882. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 
Stat. 504. See generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGER: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). 
 17. An Act to Carry Into Effect Certain Provisions in the Treaties Between the United States and 
China and the Ottoman Porte, Giving Certain Judicial Powers to Ministers and Consuls of the United 
States in Those Countries, 30 Cong. Ch. 150, 9 Stat. 276 (1848). For major revisions of this Act, in 
keeping with revisions of the Treaty of Wanghia along with new and amended extraterritoriality 
treaties with other countries, see An Act to Carry Into Effect Provisions of the Treaties Between the 
United States, China, Japan, Siam, Persia, and Other Countries, Giving Certain Judicial Powers to 
Ministers and Consuls or Other Functionaries, of the United States in Those Countries, and for Other 
Purposes, 36 Cong. Ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72 (1860); An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Carry 
Into Effect Provisions of the Treaties Between the United States, China, Japan, Siam, Persia, and 
Other Countries, Giving Certain Judicial Powers to Ministers and Consuls or Other Functionaries, of 
the United States in Those Countries, and for Other Purposes,” 41 Cong. Ch. 194, 16 Stat. 183 (1870). 
 18. See An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction Thereof, 
supra note 4. 
 19. Extraterritorial Remedial Code § 15, available at the National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, MD, in Record Group 59, Department of State, Decimal Files 1910–29 
[hereinafter National Archives, RG 59], as an attachment to doc. 171.2/19. 
RUSKOLA_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008 7:57:06 AM 
Summer 2008] COLONIALISM WITHOUT COLONIES 221 
American treaties20 as well as the court’s organic act.21 In the strange conditions 
of American extraterritoriality in China, however, even the innocent phrase 
“laws of the United States” led to serious interpretive difficulties. For example, 
did it cover only federal legislation passed by the United States Congress, or did 
it include the common law as well? If so, the common law of which state—or 
states? 
A. Federal Laws 
At the heart of some of the most difficult questions was the court’s irregular 
place in the American judicial hierarchy. At the most basic level, was it a 
federal or state court? Obviously—or perhaps not?—China was not a “state” of 
the United States. In the end, the only thing truly obvious was that the court 
was sui generis. Some did in fact seek to analogize China (along with the U.S.-
occupied Philippines) to a state, at least as far as the organization of the bar was 
concerned. Chauncey Holcomb, District Attorney for the District of China, 
explained to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “We have a bar 
association which is a branch of the American Bar Association, just the same as 
the States of Delaware or New Jersey.”22 The local branch, the Far Eastern 
American Bar Association, indeed convinced the American Bar Association to 
amend its definition of “state” so as to include the District of China within it.23 
The court itself, however, much preferred to associate itself with the 
prestige of the federal system. In the preface to the first volume of the court’s 
case reports, Judge Lobingier described his jurisdiction confidently as 
“territorially the largest district of our Federal Court system.”24 Elsewhere, he 
referred to his tribunal—slightly more equivocally—as “a part of the Federal 
Judicial system, corresponding in grade mainly to the District Courts.”25 In the 
opinion of Lobingier’s former district attorney, the judge of the U.S. Court for 
China was just “a regular district judge”26 (although he did recognize the rather 
 
 20. Treaty of Wanghia, supra note 8, art. XXI; Treaty of Tientsin, supra note 13, art. XI. 
 21. An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction Thereof, 
supra note 4. 
 22. United States Court for China: Hearing on S. 4014 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
64th Cong. 16 (1917) (statement of Chauncey Holcomb, District Attorney for District of China). 
 23. FAR EASTERN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRESIDENT’S ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1919, at 6 
(1919), available in National Archives, RG 59, as attachment to doc. 172.6/202 (“The word ‘state,’ 
whenever used in this Constitution, shall be deemed to comprise . . . insular or other possessions of the 
United States and places over which the United States exercises territorial jurisdiction.”). The Far 
Eastern American Bar Association was established in 1914 and became affiliated with the ABA in 
1915. It had three vice-presidents—one each for North China, South China, and the Philippines—and in 
1916 it had a total of forty-seven members. U.S. COURT FOR CHINA, DECENNIAL ANNIVERSARY 
BROCHURE 48, 52–53 (1916), available in National Archives, RG 59, enclosure to doc. 172./653 
[hereinafter DECENNIAL ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE]. 
 24. Charles Sumner Lobingier, Editor’s Preface, in 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES iii (1920). 
 25. CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER, AMERICAN COURTS IN CHINA 6–7 (1919) (emphasis added). 
Cf. UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA, DECENNIAL ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE 1 (1916). 
 26. Hearing on H.R. 7909 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 74th Cong. 13 (1935) 
(statement of Chauncey Holcomb, District Attorney for District of China). 
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anomalous fact that the judge’s district was “as large as our homeland” 27). The 
State Department, too, happily referred to the U.S. Court for China as “a 
regular district court of the United States.”28 
Nevertheless, all these claims about the court’s utter ordinariness were 
belied by Judge Lobingier’s efforts on behalf of legislation that would 
“expressly” confer on him “the powers of a judge of the district court of the 
United States.”29 The Ninth Circuit indeed deliberately declined to address the 
status of the court. The China Trade Act, one of the few pieces of congressional 
legislation passed specifically for application in China, provided that, for its 
purposes, the term “federal district court” included the U.S. Court for China.30 
Confronted with a dispute under the Act, in dicta, the Ninth Circuit merely 
“[a]ssum[ed], without deciding, that the U.S. Court for China was ‘a court of the 
United States.’”31 
Of course, the court was like a federal court in that any definition of the law 
it was charged with applying—“the laws of the United States”—undoubtedly 
included general legislation enacted by Congress. However, this body of law 
was largely irrelevant to the lives that Americans lived in China; they married, 
divorced, entered into contracts and breached them, embezzled, raped, 
murdered, wrote wills and died, and Congress had had very little to say about 
such matters. Judge Lobingier—the longest serving judge on the court—himself 
acknowledged that, although his court “derive[d] its entire authority from the 
Federal Government,” it nevertheless exercised “much of the jurisdiction 
commonly possessed by a state court.”32 The court’s main problem from the 
beginning was that the only body of law to which it had an unquestionable 
claim—general acts of Congress—was simply irrelevant to the disputes that 
were typically brought before it.33 
B. Common Law 
Fortunately, Congress had anticipated the potential inadequacy of federal 
legislation in the conditions of China. In setting up the court, it had provided 
 
 27. Id. at 7 (statement of Chauncey Holcomb, District Attorney for District of China). 
 28. United States Court for China: Hearing on S. 4014 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 22, at 3 (statement of Wilbur J. Carr, Director of Consular Service, State Department). In 
fact, an early draft of the bill for the U.S. Court for China described the court expressly as a “district 
court”; however, this characterization was left out of the final bill. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 58-95, at 2 (1905). 
 29. S. REP. NO. 101, at 20 (1916). 
 30. China Trade Act 1922 § 2(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 142 (West 2008). Cf. An Act to Regulate the 
Practice of Pharmacy and the Sale of Poison in the Consular Districts of the United States in China, 
Pub. L. No. 63-262, 38 Stat. 817 (1915). 
 31. Smith v. Am. Asiatic Underwriters, Fed., Inc., U.S.A., 127 F.2d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1942). Cf. 
United States v. Chapman, 14 F.2d 312 (W.D. Wash. 1926) (considering the U.S. Court for China a 
district court for the purposes of removal of a criminal suspect for trial). 
 32. In re Corrigan’s Estate, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 717, 721 (1918). 
 33. See LOBINGIER, supra note 25, at 11 (complaining that federal law “deal[s] with subjects 
(mostly of public law) not directly affecting the ordinary American citizen residing in this part of the 
world”). 
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that where “the laws of the United States . . . are deficient in the provisions 
necessary to give jurisdiction or to furnish suitable remedies, the common law 
and the law as established by the decisions of the courts of the United States 
shall be applied.”34 The good news was that this provision did provide 
Americans in China with basic rights based in common law—those of 
“property, succession, the contract, which constitute the staple matter of 
ordinary life.”35 The bad news was that this appeared to be an archaic common 
law frozen in a much earlier time. Given that each state had developed its own 
common law since separation from England, the U.S. Court for China 
explained that “the common law” as a singular body of law referred generally to 
the common law of England as it existed in American colonies “at the date of 
the transfer of sovereignty.”36 
The result may have been logically satisfying, but in practical terms it 
implied that the court was called on to “ascertain the common or unwritten law 
in force in the colonies prior to the Declaration of Independence” and then to 
“attempt to apply it to modern conditions in China,” as one eminent Shanghai 
lawyer put it, adding that this was certainly an occasion for some 
“amazement.”37 Remarkably, the only thing that seemed to amaze him was the 
temporal disjunction—not the fact of applying American law in China, so long 
as it was state-of-the-art American law. 
C. Laws of Alaska and the District of Columbia 
Functionally, then, the U.S. Court for China was left with the hybrid task of 
serving as a federal court and a state court, yet as far as the latter role was 
concerned, its misfortune was to be a state court without a state. In the leading 
case of Biddle v. United States (described by one commentator as “epoch-
making”38), Judge Wilfley resolved the court’s dilemma with the simple act of 
borrowing the municipal code of the District of Columbia and the territorial 
 
 34. An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction Thereof, 
supra note 4, § 4. 
 35. United States Judicial Authority in China, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 495; 1855 US AG LEXIS 28, *16–
17 (1855). 
 36. United States v. Biddle, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 84, 87 (1907) (holding that the common 
law applicable in the U.S. Court in China was “the common law in force in the several American 
colonies at the date of the separation from the mother country”). Analogously, the Supreme Court of 
the Territory of Wyoming held in 1879 that “the common law” in force in the Territory was “English 
common law proper” as it stood “at the date of the Declaration of Independence”—not a synthetic 
“compound of the law as it applied in the several states.” Ware v. Wanless, 2 Wyo. 144, 152–53 (1879). 
 37. LOBINGIER, supra note 25, at 17 (quoting Stirling Fessenden’s characterization of the court’s 
jurisprudence). Equally important, the decision rested on factually incorrect premises. Under Swift v. 
Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), which would not be overruled until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), a body of federal common law did indeed exist, which the court failed to acknowledge. Some 
federal guidance in criminal matters arrived subsequently in the form of a federal criminal law when 
Congress enacted the Federal Penal Code. For application of the Federal Penal Code in China, see, for 
example, United States v. Diaz, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 784 (1918); United States v. LeClair, 1 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 414 (1914). Yet the Code was far from comprehensive and, of course, 
provided no coverage at all outside of criminal law. 
 38. Bishop, supra note 2, at 285. 
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code of Alaska.39 As congressional statutes, these codes were certainly laws 
enacted by the United States, even though this still left room to argue about 
whether the two codes were laws of the United States, in terms of their 
territorial applicability.40 Equally important, since neither the District of 
Columbia nor the Territory of Alaska enjoyed the rights of full self-
government, these congressional codes covered also what would ordinarily have 
been state-law matters. 
The solution was strikingly effective, yet it seemed to ignore entirely what 
Congress could possibly have intended in passing the D.C. and Alaska codes.41 
The court expressly acknowledged that “Congress may enact a law for a limited 
area under its exclusive jurisdiction, such as Alaska or the District of Columbia” 
and that the law may “by its terms . . . have no force whatever outside of such 
area.”42 Yet, the court insisted that, so long as such a law was both necessary and 
suitable for the purposes of its extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, it was the 
law in China.43 Quite simply, in the court’s view “any pertinent act of Congress” 
was in force in the District of China “regardless of the limits within which it was 
originally intended to apply.”44 
This reasoning had startling implications. As the leading Shanghai lawyer 
Stirling Fessenden put it, in one bold stroke, it got the court out of “the 
wilderness of colonial common law.”45 After a dearth of applicable law, the U.S. 
Court for China was suddenly awash in an excess of law. As a dismayed 
 
 39. See Biddle, supra note 36, at 124–26. Subsequently, the Court extended its holding to cover civil 
matters as well. See Cavanagh v. Worden, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 317 (1914). 
 40. The court’s position was in fact later validated by the United States Supreme Court. In 1915, 
the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, passed by Congress but 
applicable only to the Philippines, was “a statute of the United States.” Gsell v. Insular Collector of 
Customs, 239 U.S. 93, 95 (1915). 
 41. Judge Wilfley’s solution in Biddle was perhaps necessary, yet legislative history indicates that 
Congress had in fact considered authorizing the application of D.C. laws in China before finally 
rejecting the idea. A 1905 draft bill for the U.S. Court for China directed the court to apply “the laws of 
the United States and the laws of the District of Columbia not in conflict therewith,” with the evident 
implication that “the laws of the District of Columbia” were not encompassed in the phrase “the laws 
of the United States.” MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC NO. 58-95, at 
3 (1905) (emphasis added). The decision to drop the reference to D.C. laws from the final bill thus 
suggests that as a matter of legislative intent, D.C. laws were not meant to be included in the mandate 
of the U.S. Court for China. 
 42. United States v. Allen, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 308, 311 (1914). 
 43. Id. The sole qualifications for “a law of the United States” to be applicable in China were that 
it had to be both “necessary” for the exercise of the court’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (which was the 
case with almost every law, at least in Judge Lobingier’s opinion) as well as “suitable” for the 
conditions of China. Id. On their own terms, most laws were not suitable to China; for one thing, almost 
invariably they contained references to government organs and officials that did not even exist in the 
District of China. The court brushed such objections aside summarily. For example, where a statute 
might refer to a D.C. “workhouse,” an institution absent in China, the court would simply substitute the 
Shanghai American “prison” as the most closely analogous institution. See U.S. v. Osman, 1 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 540 (1916). 
 44. Osman, supra note 43, at 544. Remarkably, the court’s holding in Biddle was followed in other 
extraterritorial cases as well. See In re Blanchard’s Estate, 29 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1941) (holding, in appeal 
from the Unted States Consular Court at Cairo, Egypt, that “the law governing intestate succession is 
found in the special acts of Congress providing for intestate succession in the District of Columbia”). 
 45. UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA, DECENNIAL ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE 21, 24 (1916). 
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member of the House Committee on Foreign Relations summed up the 
situation, “any law enacted from the foundation of the Government of United 
States up to the present time that the court may think applicable is 
applicable”46—regardless of whether such act had been originally passed for the 
U.S. as a whole, or for Washington, D.C., Alaska, the Philippines, or any other 
federal territory. In short, the court’s holding resulted in an explosion—or 
perhaps more properly an implosion—of American law into China: all federal 
law applicable anywhere in the United States and its territories was now 
potentially the law in China. 
In Judge Wilfley’s opinion, it had been one of the court’s “worst 
embarrassments” that it lacked “an adequate body of laws to be applied.”47 
Instead, the court was now faced with the novel problem of choosing among an 
exhilarating proliferation of law. When the House Foreign Relations 
Committee protested the broad judicial discretion such choice entailed, Judge 
Lobingier disingenuously denied the need to resort to any discretion at all: “the 
policy of the court has been to apply every act that could be applied, and it has 
not seemed desirable to exclude anything that seems to have any bearing on the 
conditions [in China] at all.”48 To be sure, just as Judge Lobingier seemingly 
never confronted a case over which he did not want to take jurisdiction, so he 
never appeared to come across a law that he did not want to apply in China.49 
Yet this hardly eliminated the need for choice of law, since territoriality—the 
key traditional criterion in choice of law analysis—was not of much use in the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. For example, which law should the court 
apply when legislation for the various territories was in conflict? Or if a special 
act, say, for Alaska, conflicted with a general congressional statute, which 
should govern? 
To address the problem, the court applied two basic principles. First, when 
two special acts (that is, federal laws of limited territorial application) 
conflicted, the later enactment was to control over the earlier one.50 Second, in a 
conflict between a special act and a general one, the general act was to take 
 
 46. United States Court for China: Hearing on S. 4014 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 22, at 10 (statement of Rep. Henry Cooper, Member, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs). 
The bill under consideration, which sought to codify the law applicable in the U.S. Court for China, was 
never passed. 
 47. Judge Wilfley Before the New York Chamber of Commerce, March 5, 1908, 8 J. AM. ASIATIC 
ASS’N 69, 71 (Apr. 1908). 
 48. United States Court for China: Hearing on H.R. 4281 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
65th Cong. 13 (1917) (statement of Charles Lobingier, Judge, United States Court for China) (emphasis 
added). 
 49. Referring to his exceedingly broad interpretation of the Biddle doctrine—blessed by the Ninth 
Circuit—which opened the door for the application of even “special acts” of Congress in China, Judge 
Lobingier maintained that “there can be no half way adoption of that doctrine; it includes all such laws 
or none. It cannot logically be restricted to any particular class of acts. It is just as applicable to civil 
laws as to criminal; just as ‘necessary’ in respect to corporations as to procedure.” United States ex rel. 
Raven v. McRae, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 655, 664 (1917). 
 50. See, e.g., Cavanagh supra note 39, at 371; Way Cheong & Co., Ltd. v. Methodist Episcopal 
Church (South) Mission, 2 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 490, 491 (1923). 
RUSKOLA_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008 7:57:06 AM 
226 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:217 
precedence.51 Applying these rules to the choice between the codes for the 
District of Columbia and for the territory of Alaska, presumably the slightly 
newer D.C. code should have controlled over the Alaska code. Yet in the 
opinion of Judge Lobingier, “[m]uch of the District of Columbia legislation is 
inherited from colonial Maryland and is therefore antiquated,” which was the 
very infirmity the court was trying to avoid.52 Moreover, Lobingier noted, D.C. 
legislation was enacted for an urban community whose life was “complex” and 
“highly advanced.”53 Therefore, it was “ill adapted to conditions in a country 
like China”—those conditions being, by implication, simple and primitive.54 In 
contrast, “the Compiled Laws of Alaska afford a fairly modern and up to date 
piece of legislation,” and, besides, they were designed for “a primitive, frontier 
community,” and thus seemed “far more suitable and workable” for China.55 
Apparently, then, D.C. legislation was both too old and designed for such a 
highly developed community as to be inappropriate for China; the laws of 
Alaska were preferable because they were more modern and suitable for 
primitive conditions.56 
By whatever leap of logic Judge Lobingier arrived at his preference for the 
laws of Alaska, those laws did not necessarily always take precedence over 
legislation for the District of Columbia, either—except when they did. In the 
opaque legal universe of the District of China, observers could not agree on 
what was, even in theory, the jurisdiction’s primary source of law; some claimed 
it was the D.C. code,57 while others believed it was the territorial code for 
Alaska.58 This was no wonder, considering the patchwork of law the court 
created. Not only were its choices often inconsistent, in that it preferred D.C. 
legislation in one area of law and Alaska law in another, but the court felt free 
to mix-and-match even within an area of law. For example, although D.C. law 
 
 51. See, e.g., Ezra v. Merriman, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 809, 810 (1918). 
 52. United States Court for China: Hearing on H.R. 4281 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 48, at 55 (statement of Charles Lobingier, Judge, United States Court for China). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Elsewhere, Judge Lobingier asserted his preference for the D.C. code thus: 
[A]s between the Alaskan and Columbian Codes, both enacted by the same Congress, the 
former, which is a few months the earlier, having been drafted for a sparsely settled, frontier 
community, is, on the whole, better suited to conditions in China than the latter, tho each 
contains desirable features not found in the other. 
Lobingier, supra note 25, at 14. 
 57. Note: The United States Court for China, 49 HARV. L. REV. 793, 794 (1935–36) (stating that 
legislation “for the District of Columbia . . . now forms the principal source of law for the Court for 
China”). See also Bishop, supra note 2, at 297 (“For all legal purposes, [the] position [of an American 
citizen in China] is the same as though he were in the Federal District.”). 
 58. United States Court for China: Hearing on H.R. 4281 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 48, at 7 (statement of Charles Lobingier, Judge, United States Court for China) (arguing 
that “not only the lawyers in the courts but business men [sic] and litigants—prospective litigants, at 
least—have settled down to the proposition that the[] Alaska laws are the principal ones”). See also 
American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 780 (9th Cir., 1921) (“conceding, without deciding, that the 
Alaska Code is controlling in the United States Court for China . . .”). 
RUSKOLA_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008 7:57:06 AM 
Summer 2008] COLONIALISM WITHOUT COLONIES 227 
applied to divorce generally,59 the court nevertheless applied the law of Alaska 
to determine the parties’ residence for purposes of divorce.60 
The laws of Alaska experienced some especially dramatic twists. For 
example, once the court had declared that the federally enacted corporation law 
of Alaska was available for the creation of American corporations in China, the 
court then insisted that Alaskan corporation law would remain valid in China 
even after it was repealed in Alaska.61 In effect, the corporation law of Alaska 
continued to live on as a ghostly presence in China, long after its demise in 
Alaska. Alarmed at this extraordinary situation, the Congress passed the 1922 
China Trade Act, a special law applicable only in China, for the creation of 
American corporations for the purpose of doing business in China.62 When the 
court still refused to let the Alaskan corporation law die, in 1925 the Congress 
amended the 1922 Act to make it perfectly clear that from then on the China 
Trade Act was to be the only law under which American businesses were to 
incorporate in China.63 
Apart from Congress’s concern about the state of Alaskan law in China, 
there were several other attempts as well—all of them unsuccessful—to define 
more precisely just which “laws of the United States” the court was supposed to 
be applying. As early as 1908, Congress had considered improving “the code of 
 
 59. Cavanagh, supra note 39, at 371 (“Of the two Acts of Congress . . . prescribing grounds for 
divorce, that relating to the District of Columbia, as the latest expression of legislative opinion, will 
naturally be applied here if the two are in conflict.”) 
 60. United States Court for China: Hearing on S. 4014 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 22, at 8 (statement of Mr. Holcomb). The House Committee on Foreign Affairs was quite 
stunned by this: 
MR. COOPER: You mean by that that [the judge] uses the code of Alaska, so far as the 
residence requirement is concerned, and then applies the code of the District of Columbia for 
the rest of it? 
MR. HOLCOMB: That is very well known, sir. 
MR. COOPER: It may well be known. You mean that the judge selects what he thinks is the 
best to be administered? 
MR. HOLCOMB: That is all he has to go by. 
Id. at 19. 
 61. McRae, supra note 49, at 656. Essentially, the court argued that to hold otherwise would permit 
the citizens of Alaska to repeal legislation applicable to the District of China and thus, effectively, to 
legislate outside its territorial limits. Id. While the U.S. Court for China might have been thought 
sympathetic to the possibility of extraterritorial legislation, in the case of Alaska it found such a result 
“monstrous” and, accordingly, held that Alaskans were empowered to repeal laws of the Territory of 
Alaska only insofar as those laws applied to them, not anyone else. Id. 
 62. An Act to Authorize the Creation of Corporations for the Purpose of Engaging in Business 
Within China (China Trade Act), 67 Cong. Ch. 346, 67 Pub. L. No. 312, 42 Stat. 849 (1922). 
 63. An Act to Amend the China Trade Act 1922 (China Trade Act Amendments), 68 Pub. L. No. 
484, 43 Stat. 995 (1925) (“Hereafter no corporation for the purpose of engaging in business within 
China shall be created under any law of the United States other than the China Trade Act.”). In any 
event, the awareness of either D.C. or Alaska law remained quite elementary in the District of China—
despite the court’s boasts of being home to the “most valuable library of federal legislation” outside of 
the United States. Consider, for example, the following urgent query that the District Attorney cabled 
to the State Department: “Please ask District Attorney, District of Columbia, and telegraph answer 
what provision of law available to prosecute for throwing rock and breaking window in private 
building.” Telegram from District Attorney of U.S. Court for China to Secretary of State (June 19, 
1926) (on file with the National Archives, RG 59, doc. 172.006/57). 
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laws governing the conduct of the United States Court for China” by directing it 
to apply the laws of California.64 Judge Lobingier himself pushed for a bill that 
would have codified his preferred (and ultimately discretionary) mix of laws: 
making Alaska the primary source of law in China, while the District of 
Columbia code would continue to apply in cases where the laws of Alaska were 
“deficient.”65 
It is also noteworthy that even after the court had selected a law and found 
it both “necessary” and “suitable,” in the requisite sense of these terms, it then 
declared itself free to ignore the penalties prescribed by the otherwise 
applicable law. The court admitted frankly that “the case must be exceptional 
where one part of a statute is applicable and the other part not.”66 However, the 
court adverted to “obvious difficulties” that would arise given that “the 
penalties fixed for similar offenses in the [codes of Alaska and District of 
Columbia] differ from each other.”67 The court never explained what these 
“obvious difficulties” were; seemingly, either one or the other code would have 
been applicable in a given case, and the penalty would likewise have been 
governed by the same code. The court simply asserted that the applicable 
section of the code of Alaska “leaves the fixing of penalties for criminal 
offenses committed within this extraterritorial jurisdiction to the discretion of 
trial officers. For that reason it is not believed that the Court is bound by the 
penalties prescribed in [the codes of Alaska and District of Columbia].”68 
Almost as an afterthought, the court noted that “while the penalties fixed in 
those codes are not binding on this Court they may be well utilized as guides 
and treated with great respect.”69 At least, the court was permitted to follow the 
law, even if it was not required to do so. 
D. The United States Constitution 
How did the court’s work comport with the Constitution? Caleb Cushing, 
the man who negotiated America’s very first extraterritoriality treaty in 1844 
and who subsequently became U.S. Attorney General,70 believed firmly that 
under the regime he had helped create, the Constitution would apply in China 
 
 64. UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA, H.R. REP. NO. 60-1662 (1908). 
 65. United States Court for China: Hearing on H.R. 4281 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 48, at 55 (statement of Charles Lobingier, Judge, United States Court for China). 
 66. United States v. Grimsinger, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 282, 285 (1912). 
 67. Id. at 286. 
 68. Id. Construing the language in the section of the Alaska statute that provided for an element of 
discretion in determining the penalty, the court not only forced a reading of the language that made the 
discretion limitless in the District of China, but it then claimed that “this definite and specific 
language . . . disclos[ed] the intent of Congress that the fixing of penalties for the punishment of crimes 
in this extraterritorial jurisdiction should be at the discretion of the trial officer.” Id. at 285 (emphasis 
added). The appeal to legislative intent is spurious, considering how implausible it is that any member 
of Congress would have foreseen that the code of Alaska would eventually be applied in China as well. 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. See generally JOHN M. BELOHLAVEK, BROKEN GLASS: CALEB CUSHING AND THE 
SHATTERING OF THE UNION (2005); CLAUDE MOORE FUESS, THE LIFE OF CALEB CUSHING (1923). 
On Cushing’s role in negotiating the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844, see also Ruskola, supra note 6. 
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as well, and he indicated so in an opinion he gave in 1855.71 However, while 
Cushing thought that the Constitution did apply in China and that American 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in China was consistent with it, in 1881 the Senate 
ended up debating the constitutionality of the entire system of consular justice. 
In response to a seemingly innocent request for funds for the maintenance of an 
American jail in China, one Senator queried urgently, “I would like to know, 
just for the peace of my own conscience as a Senator, what authority we have to 
vote money to keep [Americans] in jail [in China] until somebody can hang 
them by judicial murder. . . . I assert here that they are in prison there in 
violation of the Constitution of the United States.”72 This concern was shared by 
Secretary Blaine in the State Department, most notably, who suggested twice, 
in 1881 and 1884, that the United States replace the make-shift consular court 
system in China with a proper judicial tribunal, complete with a jury and the full 
panoply of constitutional guarantees.73 Ironically, the U.S. Court for China grew 
out of Blaine’s notion, without incorporating the constitutional guarantees that 
had most concerned the Congress and the State Department.74 In any event, 
such concerns were laid to rest definitively by the Supreme Court in 1881 when 
it announced, in an appeal from a consular court in Japan, “By the Constitution 
a government is ordained and established ‘for the United States of America,’ 
and not for countries outside of their limits.”75 Quite simply, the Court held, 
“The Constitution can have no operation in another country.”76 Whether 
 
 71. United States Judicial Authority in China, supra note 35, at *16. 
 72. 11 Cong. Rec. S410 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1881) (statement of Sen. Carpenter). The Senator 
expressed considerable consternation at the legislation authorizing U.S. extraterritorial courts in China: 
I must apologize to Senators who have charged me with having been on the Judiciary 
Committee for several years and with not having brought forward a bill for the repeal of these 
statutes. I must say, and I say truthfully, that until within two years I had no more idea that 
such a provision could be found on any statutes passed by Congress than I had that I should 
be hanged myself by the judgment of a lamp-lighter. 
Id. at 415 (statement of Sen. Carpenter). It is noteworthy that the Senator’s proposed remedy was not 
judicial withdrawal from China but rather the establishment of proper courts to exercise United States’ 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: “You should establish a court to try [Americans in China], according to the 
Constitution. You should have a judicial district and a judge, a law for subpoenaing a grand jury, and 
you should have attorneys, clerks, &c., as we do at home.” Id. at 413 (statement of Sen. Carpenter). 
It is notable that the Supreme Court of California had considered the constitutionality of consular 
courts in China in 1859 and upheld them. Forbes et al. v. Scannell, 14 Cal. 242, 279 (1859). In 1875, the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered an appeal from an American consular court in Egypt and similarly 
rejected a constitutional challenge to it. Dainese v. Hall, 91 U.S. 13 (1875). 
 73. See, e.g., MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Exec. Doc. No. 47-21 
(1881). 
 74. See FRANK E. HINCKLEY, AMERICAN CONSULAR JURISDICTION IN THE ORIENT 75–77 
(1906); Bishop, supra note 2, at 284. 
 75. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). In re Ross is, of course, no longer good law; in 1956, the 
Supreme Court called it “a relic from a different era,” and it referred to the notion of a consular court 
by placing the word “court” in quotation marks. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12, 10 (1957). The 
contemporary debate—most notably with regard to the U.S. military bases in Guantánamo Bay—is 
about the precise extent to which the Constitution applies extraterritorially. 
 76. Id. Subsequently, the Insular Cases established the doctrine that even within the United States 
the residents of so-called “unincorporated” territories enjoyed a lesser degree of constitutional 
protection. For example, a conviction without an indictment or without a unanimous jury in the 
annexed islands of Hawaii was held not to violate the U.S. Constitution. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 
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American courts in China complied with the Constitution had been declared 
officially a moot question. 
Indeed, by 1925, the U.S. Court for China summarily asserted that there was 
not even a “hint” that the Constitution was in force in the District of China.77 
Thus, even though every other federal law in force in the United States and its 
territories—and even some that had been repealed—was exportable to China, 
the supreme law of the land was not.78 (Still, and rather inexplicably, the oath of 
admission to the bar of the U.S. Court for China required each candidate to 
“solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States of America.”79 Taking this duty seriously would obviously have put a 
member of the bar on an inevitable collision course with the court’s 
jurisprudence.) 
The court’s declaration that it was free to mete out whatever penalties it 
preferred was hardly the only constitutionally suspect practice in which it 
engaged. Chauncey Holcomb, a former District Attorney for the District of 
China, explained to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “If a man is 
arrested and locked up when the Judge happens to be away, sometimes we have 
to keep that man locked up for six months waiting for trial.”80 The judge might 
be away for several reasons. For one thing, he was required by statute to hold 
sessions at least once a year in Hankow, Tientsin, and Canton. This was indeed 
roughly equivalent to a New York judge being required to take his court 
periodically to Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco, and the demands of such 
travel could result in lengthy absences from the court.81 Moreover, when the 
U.S. constituencies in Shanghai were unhappy with the justice they received in 
the U.S. Court for China, they often exploited diplomatic and political avenues 
and took their grievances to Washington, D.C. During the hearings on the 
petition for Judge Wilfley’s removal, for example, the court did not sit for 
nearly a year, and, likewise, when Judge Lobingier went to Washington, D.C. to 
address charges made against him, the court’s work came to a halt.82 Tellingly, 
though, such situations were perceived as commercial crises for Americans in 
China, not constitutional ones.83 
 
197 (1903). See also FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001); GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 85–89 
(1996). 
 77. United States v. Furbush, 2 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 74, 85 (1921). 
 78. Effectively, “living in China was deemed to be American enough to permit an extraterritorial 
domicile, but not American enough to allow the Constitution to apply.” Bederman, supra note 3, at 
474. 
 79. Extraterritorial Remedial Code, supra note 19, § 15. 
 80. Hearing on H.R. 7909 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 36, at 7 (statement 
of Chauncey Holcomb, District Attorney for District of China). 
 81. Id. at 17 (statement of Chauncey Holcomb, District Attorney for District of China). 
 82. See generally FAR EASTERN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE THIRD ATTACK ON THE 
UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA: PRESS COMMENTS ON THE OUTCOME (Shanghai 1923). 
 83. During the hearings for Judge Lobingier’s removal, the American Consul General described 
the conditions in Shanghai as “deplorable”: “Creditors of American firms are unable to collect when 
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Even when it was in session, the court itself expressed little concern about 
the absence of the Constitution. Judge Lobingier, for example, felt confident 
that he could do very well without the assistance of juries, as he had previously 
while serving as a judge in the U.S.-occupied Philippines—a practice that had 
been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Insular Cases: although the 
Constitution did apply in the Philippines (since it was indisputably under U.S. 
sovereignty), it was held to require only the observation of “fundamental 
rights,” which in the Court’s view did not include jury trials.84 Indeed, Judge 
Lobingier insisted that allowing juries in China “would not be wise,” and he 
assured Congress that “there is no popular demand for anything of the sort.”85 
The latter claim at least was patently untrue. Those wary of the powers of the 
judge of the U.S. Court for China constantly complained of the lack of juries as 
a check on his power. They noted poignantly that even His Britannic Majesty’s 
Supreme Court for China had jury trials,86 while in contrast the American judge 
was entrusted with a kind of despotic power “consistent with the practice under 
the barbarous system obtaining in China, against which we were attempting to 
guard when we demanded our extra-territorial jurisdiction.”87 One member of 
the American bar in Shanghai described the procedure of the court as a “star-
chamber proceeding,”88 and even the less-than-radical Associated American 
Chambers of Commerce insisted that, at a minimum, the court should adopt a 
system in which the judge sits with lay assessors in cases that would ordinarily 
be entitled to a jury trial.89 
E. Procedure 
Despite the absence of constitutional due-process guarantees, the court did 
not function wholly without procedural guidelines. Although there were no 
federal rules of procedure to turn to until 1938, there was a set of regulations 
governing the procedure of consular courts.90 These regulations had been 
 
suit is necessary. Business firms are not inclined to deal with American firms because of the absence of 
facilities for enforcing contracts should such be necessary.” Letter from Edwin S. Cunningham, 
American Consul General in Shanghai to Wilbur J. Carr, Secretary of State (June 22, 1922) (on file 
with the National Archives, RG 59, doc. 172/684). All in all, this was regarded as “a serious matter from 
a commercial standpoint.” Id. 
 84. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). Ironically, the decision in Dorr, in turn, was 
predicated in part on the jury-less practice of the U.S. consular courts in China, which had been upheld 
in In re Ross, supra note 75, at 453. 
 85. United States Court for China: Hearing on H.R. 4281 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 48, at 11 (1917) (statement of Charles Lobingier, Judge, United States Court for China). 
 86. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. FLEMING, THE U.S. COURT FOR CHINA AS AN INSTITUTION 4 (Shanghai 
1921). 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. Chinese Court Bill: Hearing on H.R. 17142 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 60th Cong. 
11 (1908) (statement of Stirling Fessenden). 
 89. REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATED AMERICAN CHAMBERS OF 
COMMERCE OF CHINA 13 (1925). 
 90. Consular Court Regulations for China, General, 1864. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 39-1007, pt. 2, at 
413–21 (1866). For further regulations promulgated in 1881 and 1897, see HINCKLEY, supra note 73, at 
235–36. For a discussion of the court’s procedure, see also Lee, supra note 3. 
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enacted in 1864 by the Minister to China, and the China Court Act made them 
applicable to the U.S. Court for China as well,91 although it authorized the judge 
“from time to time to modify and supplement said rules of procedure.”92 Judge 
Lobingier, however, wanted to go further and draft a new code of procedure, 
not only for his own court but for the consular courts as well.93 Speaking before 
Congress in favor of a bill that would have authorized him to do so, he 
promised, “[A]s soon as this measure passes, which confirms the authority to 
make rules, it is my intention to promulgate them, and they will cover the 
subject of procedure pretty generally.”94 
The bill never passed, but Judge Lobingier wrote his own rules anyway, and 
then proceeded to apply them under the title of the Extraterritorial Remedial 
Code.95 Their legal status remained ambiguous. In an appeal from the U.S. 
Court for China, the Ninth Circuit speculated about what it thought “the 
practice prevailing in the China court” likely was, but ultimately it conceded its 
ignorance: “We do not have access to the rules.”96 The State Department was no 
more knowledgeable, although it was charged with administrative supervision 
of the court.97 When the chair of the Senate Committee on Rules asked for 
information regarding the procedure of the court,98 he was told politely that “the 
Department is not informed as to the rules under which the Court is now 
proceeding.”99 
 
 91. An Act Creating a United States Court for China and Prescribing the Jurisdiction Thereof, 
supra note 4. § 5 (“[T]he procedure of the said court shall be in accordance, so far as practicable, with 
the existing procedure prescribed for consular courts in China in accordance with the Revised Statutes 
of the United States.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. United States Court for China: Hearing on H.R. 4281 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
supra note 48, at 16 (statement of Charles Lobingier, Judge, United States Court for China). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Extraterritorial Remedial Code, supra note 19. 
 96. Am. Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1921). 
 97. See SCULLY, supra note 3, at 118–19. 
 98. Letter from Sen. Lee S. Overman to Fred K. Nielsen, Assistant Solicitor, State Department 
(Apr. 15, 1916) (on file with the National Archives, RG 59, doc. 172./644). Senator Overman’s query 
was motivated by an inquiry from a lawyer in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, who was about to graduate 
and was interested in pursuing a legal career in Shanghai. See Letter from R.T. Bryan, Jr., to Sen. Lee 
S. Overman (Apr. 12, 1916) (on file with the National Archives, RG 59, doc. 172./644). Although 
neither the Senator nor the State Department was able to provide him with the rules of procedure for 
the U.S. Court for China, the tenacious Mr. Bryan was apparently not deterred, for he was admitted to 
the bar of the court in May the following year. See Roll of Attorneys (Admitted to the Bar of the Court 
since its Organization), 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES ix (1920). 
 99. Letter from the State Department to Sen. Lee S. Overman (Apr. 18, 1916) (on file with the 
National Archives, RG 59, doc. 172./644). The State Department kindly suggested writing directly to 
the court for details. An attorney who had tried—unsuccessfully—to obtain a certified copy of the 
Extraterritorial Remedial Code had subsequently been informed that “there is apparently no record in 
the Court that this code was duly adopted or promulgated, as by order of court.” Letter from Frank E. 
Hinckley to Secretary of State (Jan. 16, 1925) (on file with the National Archives, RG 59, doc. 
172.6/369). When he wrote to the State Department expressing his alarm, the department simply sent a 
polite letter in acknowledgment (“The Department thanks you for bringing this matter to its 
attention.”). Letter from J. V. A. MacMurray, Assistant Secretary of State, to Frank E. Hinckley (Jan. 
16, 1925) (on file with the National Archives, RG 59, doc. 172.6/369). 
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F. Non-U.S. Law 
In addition to applying its own curious mix of American law, the court 
recognized that there was authority even for applying the municipal regulations 
of the International Settlement.100 Yet what was most peculiar about this 
willingness to apply the regulations was not simply that they were not American 
law, but that they existed, even in the State Department’s view, “outside of any 
general system of law.”101 Technically, the multinational International 
Settlement was on sovereign Chinese territory, yet in the mid-nineteenth 
century it essentially seceded from China and set up its own municipal 
government (including a militia and a police force) that was constitutionally 
accountable only to its electorate.102 Consequently, the regulations of the 
government of the International Settlement were not promulgated under the 
authority—direct or delegated—of any national government. 
Finally, the court applied even Chinese law. It enforced what it called 
“compradore” or “Chinese custom,”103 and it adopted Chinese law with regard 
to real property insofar as it followed the British Supreme Court for China, 
which had ruled that land would be governed by lex loci rei sitae.104 Judge 
Lobingier went so far as to propose (unsuccessfully) that the U.S. Court for 
China should in fact adopt the new Chinese codes as the law of the court—that 
way, finally, a “uniformity of laws” would obtain in China.105 
*   *   *   * 
The above is a description of some key aspects of the jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Court for China. Some of it is perhaps unsurprising, but some of it 
certainly strikes one as odd at best and outrageous at worst—and even some of 
the otherwise rather ordinary aspects of the court’s jurisprudence seem weird in 
the context of China. Before attempting to evaluate the court’s work more fully, 
how should we characterize it as a matter of positive description? 
Summarizing the jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China is not easy. On 
the one hand, Alaska and the District of Columbia were the court’s 
 
 100. In an analysis where it refused to apply Chinese postal laws, the court reproduced in detail a set 
of 1887 guidelines by the State Department, in which the Department expressed its considered opinion 
that the municipal regulations of the International Settlement (unlike Chinese laws) could in fact be 
enforced against American citizens in consular courts. Letter from Secretary Bayard to Minister Denby 
(Mar. 7, 1887), in 4 MS. INST. CHINA 244; Moore, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 648–50, reprinted in 
1 U.S. v. Donohoe, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 347, 350 (1920). 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. See, e.g., Judge Feetham Surveys Shanghai: A Digest, 4 PAC. AFFAIRS 586, 592 (No. 7, July 
1931) (explaining “a special doctrine of rights” justifying the unique position of the International 
Settlement); Robert Bickers, Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler 
Community in Shanghai 1843–1937, 159 PAST & PRESENT 161, 169 (1998); Parks M. Coble, Jr., The 
Kuomintang Regime and the Shanghai Capitalists, 1927–29, 77 CHINA Q. 1, 3 (1979). See generally 
ANATOL M. KOTENEV, SHANGHAI: ITS MUNICIPALITY AND THE CHINESE (Shanghai 1927). 
 103. King Ping Kee v. Am. Food Mfg. Co., 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 735, 736 (1918). 
 104. United States v. Bascom, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 382, 389 (1914) (citing Macdonald v. 
Anderson, H.B.M. Supreme Court for China (1904) for the British practice of applying Chinese law to 
land in China). 
 105. Charles Lobingier, Shall China Have an Uniform Legal System?, 6 CHINA L. REV. 327 (1933). 
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predominant sources of law. On the other, the law it produced was a 
remarkable synthesis that was neither the law of Alaska nor the law of the 
District of Columbia. Indeed, it was not the law of any jurisdiction anywhere, 
other than the District of China. In the end, the final product constituted a 
unique body of law of its own—a kind of “American common law of China”— 
which the court constructed for its own purposes. 
III 
EXTRA-EUROPEAN EXTRATERRITORIALITY: AN EXCEPTION? 
There is much that can be said about the extraordinary extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court for China and about the American common law 
of China it constructed. To be in a better position to consider the ways in which 
the court’s extraterritorial jurisprudence was both extraordinary and ordinary, 
it is useful to begin by placing the court’s jurisdiction within a larger global and 
longer historical context. 
Conventional analyses of classic international law, written from the 
perspective of Europe, typically view the increasing extraterritorial application 
of laws as a byproduct of globalization—the decline of “the Westphalian 
system” that is regarded as the cornerstone of the international legal order.106 
Yet as a matter of historical fact, extraterritorial jurisdiction was the rule for 
much of the world outside Europe prior to the post–World War II 
decolonization movements.107 To the extent that this history of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is recognized, it is invariably presented as “exceptional.”108 Yet 
characterizing it as an exception within the overall international legal 
architecture amounts effectively to bracketing most of the globe from 
consideration. Viewed from outside the United States, the jurisprudence of the 
United States Court for China stands out as one notable example of the 
standard extraterritorial application of the laws of Euro-American states in 
“barbaric” and “semi-civilized” countries outside the metropolitan West.109 
 
 106. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
(1996); GLOBALIZATION AND JURISDICTION (Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004); Paul Schiff 
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 311 (2002); Note, Constructing the 
State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (describing the decline of “territorial constraints on jurisdiction” as a 
reflection of “an emerging belief that the state must maintain relations with those citizens beyond its 
geographic borders”). For an analysis of the Peace of Westphalia as the origin myth of international 
law, see STEPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). 
 107. See, for example, the extensive discussion of extra-European extraterritoriality in 2 JOHN 
BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 593–755 (1906). 
 108. See, e.g., LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 481 (1905) (describing the 
existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction in “non-Christian states” as “in every point an exceptional 
one”); SIR TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL 
COMMUNITIES: ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN TIME OF WAR 223–24 (1861) (describing 
the “[e]xceptional position of Europeans whilst resident amongst Asiatics” and referring to 
extraterritoriality treaties as “in the highest degree exceptional”). 
 109. See infra text accompanying notes 122–124. 
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In most discussions of extraterritoriality, the express or implicit point of 
reference is nineteenth-century positivism—the notion that all law emanates 
from nation-states, each sovereign within its territory. The arch-positivist John 
Austin, for example, wished to define sovereignty in strictly territorial terms.110 
However, toward the end of his Province of Jurisprudence Determined, even 
Austin had to admit grudgingly that law does in fact frequently operate 
extraterritorially.111 He recognized similarly that, in order to render his 
definition of positive law complete, he could not simply ignore what he called 
“anomalous cases.”112 Nevertheless, he insisted that such cases were not relevant 
to a “general attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence.”113 Rather, 
they could be simply “tacked to the definition in the way of supplement.”114 
Stated slightly differently, in the end in Austin’s provincial jurisprudence, 
the proper “province” of jurisprudence is that of a territorially hermetic nation-
state. It does in fact seem accurate to observe that as far as Europe is 
concerned, the notion of territorial jurisdiction enjoyed at least relatively 
greater respect in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth century.115 But as 
the conventional story goes, in the aftermath of World War I the political map 
of Europe fragmented, and thereafter the continuing decline of national 
sovereignty has been accompanied by a move to multilateral institutions 
instead.116 Yet the case of China reminds us that the increasing resort to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction today is not only an incident of twentieth-century 
world wars, twenty-first century globalization, or the emergence of transactions 
that take place in an elusive “cyberspace.”117 To view it as an exception to a 
 
 110. See Generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Prometheus 
Books 2000) (1832). 
 111. Id. at 351–54. 
 112. Id. at 355. 
 113. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 114. Id. One need hardly be a self-identified deconstructionist to be alerted by Austin’s 
characterization of extraterritoriality as a mere “supplement” to ordinary territorial jurisdiction. For a 
classic analysis of the way in which the “supplement” is in fact constitutive of that which it (purportedly 
merely) supplements, see JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 145 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
trans., 1974). 
 115. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and American 
Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 219, 219 (Miles Kahler & 
Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (“In the nineteenth century the dominant rule of legal spatiality was strict 
territoriality: law and land were understood to be tightly and fundamentally linked.”). 
 116. See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987). 
 117. It is striking that one of the few references to the court in the contemporary law-review 
literature (apart from the singular analyses of the court by Lee, supra note 3, and Bederman, supra note 
3) is by a cyberlaw scholar, who proposes it as a model for a “United States District Court for the 
District of Cyberspace.” Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 100 
(1996). In considering the nature of America’s extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, it is also 
noteworthy that the debate about the regulation of law and borders in cyberspace is, at its heart, a 
debate about whether “territorial” legal rules are capable of regulating cyberspace. On one side are 
those who claim that cyberspace is qualitatively different from “real” space. In modern states—the 
argument goes—ordinary legal rules are based on the assumption that legally meaningful events take 
place in an identifiable physical location, and more often than not only in one location, which in turn 
determines jurisdiction. In cyberspace, in contrast, an event and its effects take place most often both 
“everywhere” and “nowhere” in particular: a website does not exist in a particular physical location, 
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general rule is to fall victim to a false rule–exception pattern: from a global 
perspective, in the nineteenth century extraterritorial jurisdiction was the norm 
for much of the extra-European world.118 To exaggerate only slightly, European 
international law declared the rest of the planet to be in a state of exception—a 
kind of state of emergency where “normal” rules did not apply.119 
In the West’s legal encounter with the states of Asia, for example, the 
practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction emerged as a key technology of a kind of 
nonterritorial imperialism—in effect, a colonialism without colonies as such.120 
In the nineteenth century, international legal discourse justified the practice of 
extraterritoriality explicitly on civilizational grounds, just as it justified 
colonialism more generally.121 However, international law did not divide the 
world simply into fully sovereign “civilized” states and “savages” whose lands 
were either terra nullius only waiting to be “discovered” or won through 
colonial conquest.122 In certain circumstances, a less-than-civilized—whether 
“semi-civilized” or “semi-barbaric” or even outright “barbaric”—state might 
have some degree of sovereignty, but it could not impose its laws on civilized 
men even when they entered that state’s territory.123  Over time, such an 
 
but it can be accessed from any place that has an internet connection. See David R. Johnson & David 
Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1376 (1996); David G. 
Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1383 (2002). On the other side 
of the debate are those who claim that the Internet is in fact susceptible to regulation by ordinary legal 
rules. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). Notably, the 
latter accuse the “regulation-skeptics” of being “in the grip of a nineteenth century territorialist 
conception of how ‘real space’ is regulated and how ‘real space’ conflicts of law are resolved.” Id. at 
1205. This view, they observe, “was repudiated in the middle of [the twentieth] century.” Id. Since then, 
the expansion of the extraterritorial application of law has “revolutionized conflict of laws.” Id. at 1208. 
Therefore—the claim goes—the rules that make transnational legal regulation possible today are 
equally well-suited for the regulation of territorially dispersed Internet transactions as well. Id. at 1205–
08. What is noteworthy about the debate is the mistaken assumption by both sides that a widespread 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is a late twentieth-century development. 
 118. I borrow the notion of “false rule-exception pattern” from MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 294 (1987). 
 119. Stated in terms of Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty—the “[s]overeign is he who decides 
on the exception”—Europe as a whole enjoyed sovereignty over the rest of the world. CARL SCHMITT, 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 1 (George Schwab 
trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). See also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF 
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960  98–178 (2001). 
 120. I describe extraterritoriality as a species of nonterritorial imperialism in Ruskola, supra note 6. 
 121. See generally GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY (1984). 
 122. For a general discussion of the broad legal spectrum between sovereign states on the one hand 
and colonies on the other, see, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 186–214 (1979). 
 123. As Gerrit Gong states, “Those in the barbarous sphere were granted at best only partial 
recognition as ‘semi-civilized’ states with limited or ‘imperfect’ legal status and personality, only partial 
membership in the Family of Nations, and only partial (if any) legal status.” GONG, supra note 121, at 
56. James Lorimer developed one of the more elaborate legal taxonomies of civilization: 
As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides into three concentric 
zones or spheres—that of civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage 
humanity. To these . . . belong, of right, at the hands of civilized nations, three stages of 
recognition—plenary political recognition, partial political recognition, and natural or mere 
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exemption from local law became established as the right of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, often (though not always) formalized in (more or less imposed) 
treaties.124 
Indeed, China as a whole was never colonized by the United States or any 
other western power, and the West’s extraterritorial legal presence in China 
was ultimately authorized in a series of bilateral “Treaties of Trade, Peace and 
Amity” to which China had given its formal consent—even if only at gunpoint.125 
Significantly, the United States had at its founding rejected outright territorial 
colonialism on the European model. (Although it applied its own model in 
North America, it did not regard it as colonialism at all, but simply as the young 
nation’s Manifest Destiny.) It was in fact not at all clear at first whether the 
United States would also decline to follow the European practice of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the “Oriental” states of Asia. As I have argued 
elsewhere, the Treaty of Wanghia constituted a key moment in United States’ 
political relations with Asia more generally.126 Not only did it “plac[e] our 
relations with China on a new footing, eminently favorable to the commerce 
and other interests of the United States,” as President Tyler proudly informed 
the Congress in 1845,127 but once ratified it became the model for subsequent 
American extraterritoriality treaties elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region as 
well.128 In short, although the United States had rejected European-style 
 
human recognition. . . . The sphere of partial political recognition extends to Turkey in 
Europe and in Asia, and to the old historical States of Asia which have not become European 
dependencies—viz., to Persia and the other separate States of Central Asia, to China, Siam, 
and Japan. 
1 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF THE JURAL 
RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 101–02 (William Blackwood & Sons, 1883). For 
an analysis of Chinese law as “semi-barbarous,” see, e.g., Joseph W. Rice, Family Safeguards of a Semi-
Barbarous Code, 12 LAW NOTES 29 (May 1908). 
 124. See, e.g., WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (Michael Byers, 
trans. 2000) (“[In the nineteenth century,] the civilised nations reserved a special jurisdiction (‘consular 
jurisdiction’) over their own nationals, whom they did not wish to have subjected to the legal order and 
justice system of a half-civilised or uncivilised country.”); TWISS, supra note 108, at 224 (“[F]rom the 
oldest time an immiscible character between Europeans and Orientals has been maintained. 
Europeans . . . continue [as] strangers and sojourners in the land, if they reside amongst them; they 
form de facto an extra-territorial community.”). See also Consular Jurisdiction, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 219; 
1885 U.S. AG LEXIS 40, *2–3 (1885) (referring to “the well received doctrine of international law, that 
consuls in barbarous or semibarbarous states are to be regarded as investing with extraterritoriality the 
place where their flag is planted”). 
 125. See Ruskola, supra note 6. 
 126. Id. 
 127. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 28-69, at 1 
(1845). 
 128. Most notably, Borneo (1850), Siam (1856), Japan (1857), Samoa (1878), Korea (1882), and 
Tonga (1886). See, respectively, Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.–Borneo, 
June 23, 1850, 10 Stat. 909, 5 Bevans 1080; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.–Siam, May 29, 1856, 
11 Stat. 683, 11 Bevans 982; Rights of American Citizens in Japan, U.S.–Japan, June 17, 1857, 11 Stat. 
723, 9 Bevans 359; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, U.S.–Samoa, Jan. 17, 1878, 20 Stat. 704, 11 
Bevans 437; Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.–Korea, May 22, 1882, 23 Stat. 
720, 9 Bevans 470; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.–Tonga, Oct. 2, 1886, 25 Stat. 1440, 
11 Bevans 1043. Moreover, not only did the United States adopt this European practice of empire in its 
political intercourse with Asia, but it perfected it so effectively that it came to serve as an imperial 
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colonialism (at least until its conquest of the remains of the Spanish Empire in 
the Spanish-American War), it proceeded to construct a virtual empire in the 
Asia-Pacific on the nonterritorial foundation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Indeed, even if the American extraterritorial regime in China was not 
formally a colonial one, it was hardly coincidental that the first two judges of 
the United States Court for China both served previously in America’s 
territorial colony in the Pacific: Libbeus Wilfley was a former Attorney General 
of the Philippines and Charles Lobingier a former United States Judge in the 
colony.129 Moreover, their colonial perspective was shared by even more casual 
observers of American affairs in China. For example, the noted scholar and 
codifier David Dudley Field declared, “So long as the judicial institutions of the 
Oriental states remain as they are, it is impossible to subject Americans and 
Europeans to their jurisdiction.”130 He based his claims on personal experience, 
having stayed in what he referred to as the “colony” of Shanghai.131 Tellingly, he 
conflated the legal status of a colony in the territorial sense, such as Hong 
Kong, and that of an extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as Shanghai. 
It is also noteworthy that as early as 1859 the California Supreme Court had 
observed, in an appeal from a consular court, “It seems that American citizens 
residing for the purpose of trade in the ports of China are not regarded as 
subjects of that government, but that, for purposes of government and 
protection, they constitute a kind of colony, subject to the laws and authority of 
the United States.”132 The U.S. Court for China declined that particular analogy, 
but instead it held that “China, in so far as the administration of the estates of 
Americans decedent therein is concerned, is a separate, distinct and complete 
jurisdiction, similar to that of an unorganized territory belonging to the United 
States”133—a comparison that paid equally little respect to Chinese sovereignty. 
In sum, given its similarities to and differences from classic territorial 
imperialism, Western extraterritoriality in China constituted a kind of 
 
model in its own right. Although the British had been the first to obtain extraterritoriality in China, the 
American statement of extraterritorial rights in the treaty language itself was regarded as “superior” in 
terms of precision and extensive coverage and it came to be hailed as “one of the distinct contributions 
of the treaty to the diplomacy of the Far East.” See KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, THE HISTORY OF 
EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 1784–1844, at 140–41 (1917). In the 
end, the American extraterritoriality provision became the model for the other European nations that 
entered into their own treaties with China in the following years. See Ruskola, supra note 6. 
 129. See SCULLY, supra note 3, at 111, 140–41; WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, THE INTRODUCTION OF 
AMERICAN LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO 1898–1905, at 76 (1989). 
 130. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, Applicability of International Law to Oriental Nations, in 1 SPEECHES, 
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 447, 455 (A. P. Sprague ed., 
1884). For the original paper, see David Dudley Field, De la possibilité d’appliquer le droit international 
européen aux nations orientales: Mémoire presenté à l’Institut de droit international, 7 REVUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 659, 663 (1875). 
 131. Field, Applicability of International Law to Oriental Nations, supra note 130, at 455. In his 
embellished account of Chinese justice he claimed that “[t]he punishments inflicted in all Oriental 
nations are strange and cruel” and insisted that they included even “crucifixion”—a claim without any 
factual justification regarding China. Id. 
 132. Forbes v. Scannell, 13 Cal. 242, 279 (1859). 
 133. Cunningham v. Rodgers, 1 EXTRATERRITORIAL CASES 109, 110 (1907). 
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colonialism without colonies that was in some ways remarkably modern—more 
akin to neocolonialism than to traditional colonialism, insofar as neocolonialism 
refers to “the largely economic rather than the largely territorial enterprise of 
imperialism.”134 At the same time, and paradoxically, to regard the practice of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as primarily a development of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries is to ignore its long history outside Europe and 
North America, sanctioned by Euro-American international law.135 
IV 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CONFLICTS 
To return to the theme of this symposium, what does the U.S. Court for 
China have to tell us about conflicts of law, in light of the historical context in 
which the court operated? The extraterritorial jurisdiction to which it lay claim 
was in effect a means by which western powers were able to prevent conflicts of 
laws from even arising in the first place. An assertion of extraterritoriality 
simply trumped any local law that otherwise might have applied. In this regard, 
the conceptual framework of extraterritoriality in the extra-European world 
appears even more “imperial” that that of territorial colonialism proper. The 
latter had to confront at least the threshold question whether, and to what 
degree, it ought to recognize the existing law of an annexed territory. In 
contrast, the U.S. Court for China was not permitted even to consider whether 
it should apply Chinese law. Ultimately, its application was simply not (at least 
in theory) a legitimate option, given the foundational legal fiction that, for 
jurisdictional purposes, China was to be treated as if it were part of the United 
States—a mere “District of China.” China as such simply disappeared behind 
the judicial horizon. At the same time, even though the U.S. Court for China 
was foreclosed from even considering Chinese law, the court could not ignore it 
in practice. Indeed, as we have seen, although the court did not have either the 
statutory or treaty-based authority to do so, it did apply Chinese law in at least 
some cases, as well as local “compradore” or “Chinese custom.”136 
 
 134. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A 
HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 3 (1999). See also Donald E. Pease, US Imperialism: Global 
Dominance Without Colonies, in A COMPANION TO POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 203 (Henry Schwarz & 
Sangeeta Ray eds., 2000). 
 135. Moreover, the imperial practice of western extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Orient did not 
disappear even with the onset of the twentieth century and the political emergence of the norm of 
national self-determination after World War I. When the abolition of extraterritoriality was being 
discussed yet again at an international conference in Washington in 1922, a contemporaneous article in 
the American Journal of International Law still insisted that “the burden of proof” remained on China 
to justify the abolition of the practice, rather than on the United States (among others) to defend its 
continuation. Benjamin H. Williams, The Protection of American Citizens in China: Extraterritoriality, 
16 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 58 (1922). Remarkably, it was not until World War II that the United States gave 
up officially its right of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. Treaty for the Relinquishment of 
Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, U.S.–China, Jan. 11, 1943, 57 
Stat. 767, 6 Bevans 739. 
 136. See supra II.F. 
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However, while the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was a 
remarkably effective way of defining away even potential conflicts between U.S. 
and Chinese law, it also introduced other, no less intractable conflicts. That is, 
the court found itself awash with conflicts among different potentially 
applicable bodies of United States law,137 rather than conflicts between Chinese 
and U.S. law. Ordinarily, these would presumably have been just the kind of 
technical questions—far removed from the politically charged matter of dealing 
with Chinese law—that any moderately competent U.S. court could handle, 
given the key role of conflicts of law in the complex functioning of the federal 
system. Yet, ironically, the U.S. Court for China had tremendous difficulties 
precisely with these mundane conflicts. 
Evidently, at the heart of the problem lay the very notion of 
extraterritoriality on which the court’s jurisdiction rested. It made the conflicts 
among potentially applicable U.S. laws impossible to resolve by the dominant 
criterion of territoriality by which they would have been resolved at home. For 
example, given that the District of China was not a state of the United States, it 
was eminently unclear which of the several state common laws should apply 
there, as we have seen.138 And although the court resorted to the codes of 
Alaska and the District of Columbia as a way of avoiding the problem, it found 
itself equally unable to choose consistently between the two codes; evidently, 
China was not Alaska or D.C., either.139 It was of course no accident that the 
court determined that the codes of Alaska and D.C. were the relevant choices: 
unorganized territories as well as the federal district were governed by the 
federal government more or less as internal colonies, without democratic 
representation. Yet at the same time, this hardly made them equivalent to the 
District of China. In the end, jurisdictional events that took place in China 
simply had no evident territorial or jurisprudential referents in the United 
States. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the body of law the court 
created—the extraordinary American common law of China that emerges from 
the pages of the Extraterritorial Reports—seems so arbitrary and so unmoored 
from any “real” (read: territorial) United States law. 
V 
CONCLUSION: BANALITY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
It is difficult to arrive at a definitive evaluation of the jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Court for China. Some of it seems banal and routine, some of it simply 
weird, and much of it weird precisely because it is so strangely matter-of-fact, as 
if the extraterritorial nature of the court’s jurisdiction were of no particular 
significance. Yet it would be too easy to take the court’s jurisprudence as an 
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 138. See supra II.C. 
 139. See supra II.C. 
RUSKOLA_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008 7:57:06 AM 
Summer 2008] COLONIALISM WITHOUT COLONIES 241 
argument in favor of a strictly territorial and national conception law against an 
extraterritorial and therefore per se “imperial” conception of law. If anything, 
the court illustrates the necessarily contingent nature of any attempt to 
maintain a coherent distinction between extraterritorial and “intraterritorial” 
jurisdiction.140 Moreover, to complain that the court failed to construct in China 
a flawless replica of the law of territorial United States would be to presuppose 
that American law in the United States is somehow “real,” a thing in itself, and 
to regard the American common law of China as merely a flawed 
“representation” of it. Surely law, “like sailing, gardening, politics, and poetry,” 
is “a craft of place” that works “by the light of local knowledge,” as Clifford 
Geertz has put it.141 Thus, while the impossibility of projecting a territorially 
based conception of American law into China gave the court a great deal of 
freedom to fashion a law of its own, it is hardly surprising that in the “District of 
China” the resulting pastiche consisted not only of eclectic pieces of American 
law but incorporated aspects of Chinese law as well. In the end, the court’s 
extraterritorial common law self-evidently had to be both “American” as well 
as “Chinese.”142 In fact, one may well view the court’s jurisprudence as an 
instance of the kind of legal pluralism that has been the defining feature of 
various regimes of territorial colonialism as well.143 
In short, while extraterritoriality created distinct problems for the court and 
gave rise to an idiosyncratic jurisprudence, in the end what is so inescapably 
disquieting about the court is not so much the nature of its jurisdiction 
 
 140. Cf. Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in GLOBALIZATION AND 
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ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (2000). 
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 143. See, e.g., M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS (1975) (describing plural legal systems in various colonial as well as neo-colonial 
contexts). This is obviously not to suggest that legal pluralism is somehow limited to colonial legal 
orders alone. See LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD 
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(territorial versus extraterritorial) or even its style of reasoning (both ordinary 
and extraordinary at various times), but simply the colonial historical context in 
which it came about and in which it operated. For colonialism without colonies 
is still a kind of colonialism—even if a (possibly) kinder colonialism. 
